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I. Introduction
The major remedy in the United States for addressing a police
illegality is the suppression of the evidence found as a result of the
illegality. This is the so-called exclusionary rule. This remedy was
thought to be necessary because, as Justice Clark explained in Mapp v.
Ohio,' other remedies, civil monetary relief or criminal prosecution of the
offending officer, had not been effective. If the police officer knows that
the evidence illegally obtained cannot be used at a later trial, he will be
deterred from violating an individual's rights.' Although in Mapp other
reasons for the exclusionary rule were suggested, such as "the imperative
of judicial integrity,"' deterrence has become the sole justification relied
on by the present Court.
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. I wish to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Beth
Waldman, class of 1993, and of Tanya Gurevich, class of 1994.
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Although Mapp was a Fourth Amendment case, the excluiomry rule has been held applicable to other amendments.
3. 367 U.S. at 659 ("The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Notihng can destroy a
governent more qucidy than its f&lure to observe its own law, or worse, its disregard of the chater of its own
existence."). See enera//'y ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-6 (1992).
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In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,4 the Supreme Court
reasoned that to give meaning to the exclusionary rule it was necessary to
apply the exclusionary sanction not only to the direct result of the
illegality, but also to the indirect consequences of the illegality as well.
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a
certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court but that it shall not be used at all." 5 This concept later became
known as the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.6 In this Article I shall
refer to the direct or immediate result of an illegality as primary evidence
and the indirect result or the fruits of the illegality as secondary evidence.7
The wisdom of the exclusionary remedy has been questioned by the
Supreme Court since the 1970s.8 Consequently, the Court has chipped
away at the applicability of the exclusionary rule; particularly with regard
to the exclusion of secondary evidence, the so-called harvest of the fruits
of the poisonous tree. The Court has created new exceptions and expanded
on existing exceptions to the exclusion of the secondary evidence.
This concern for a limitation on the exclusionary rule with regard to
secondary evidence was first expressed in Silverthorne, as the Court, on the
one hand, created a derivative evidence exclusion standard and, at the same
time, modified its effect by stating: "Of course this does not mean that the
facts thus obtained [illegally] become sacred and inaccessible." 9 Based on
this rationale, the Court created an exception to secondary evidence
exclusion, the so-called "independent source" exception." This excep-
tion, arguably, is really not an exception to the fruits doctrine because it
allows for the introduction of evidence obtained not by the illegality, but
by a separate and distinct method, an independent source. In the indepen-
dent source situation, it can be said that the fruit not only grows from the
poisonous tree, but also grows from another, non-poisonous tree.
Another exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine created
4. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
5. Id. at 391.
6. This phrase vmes coined in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
7. 4 WAYNE R. LA FAVE, SEARCH & SEaURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH Aa NmENT 369-370 (2d cd. 1987).
Ti1w cbncterization of primary and secondauy evidence is utilized by Professor LaFavo.
8. BLOOM & BRODIN, sra mote 3, at 5. Much of the criticism of the ddeereroce retiolo c= bo found in Chef
Justice Burger's dissent in Bivem v. Six Unimowm Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotic, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
[Burger] charaterized the deterrence rntiosmle as nothing more that "a v.istful dream" with no empirical
support, and hz emphasized "the high price [the rule] exraets from society. ... The Chief Justiee observed
that the rule provides no direct sanction against the offending officer, that the pra ectstor io may 1no0 the
me because of the suppreuion generally has no offieial authority over tho offending officer... and much
police action ... is net coducted in anticipation of a trial requiring proof. He complained that the
exclusionary remedy allow for no proportionality, that is, regardless of the magnitude of the police
mLsconduct or the nate of the crime, the remedy is always the same.
BLOOM AND BRODIN, smpra note 3, citing Bivem, 403 U.S. at 416-18.
9. Sllverthom Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
10. Id. a 392.
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by the Supreme Court is the "attenuation of the taint" exception." This
exception is analogous to the tort doctrine of proximate cause. The
rationale for this exception is that the secondary evidence, even though it
can be traced back to the initial illegality, is too distant or attenuated from
the illegality to be excluded. In other words, much has occurred between
the illegality and the finding of the secondary evidence:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because
it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather,
the more apt question in such cases is "whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of the primary taint."12
The final and most recent exception created by the Supreme Court is
the inevitable discovery exception. 3 This exception is closely aligned
analytically with the independent source doctrine in that it allows the
government to avoid the fruits doctrine if it can show that an independent
or alternate investigation would have led to the evidence in question. 4
However, unlike the independent source doctrine in which the alternative
source actually leads to the evidence in question, the inevitable discovery
exception is speculative, since the independent investigation only hypotheti-
cally, not actually, leads to the evidence.
It is this inevitable discovery exception that this Article explores. It
takes a close look at Nix v. Williams,"5 the Supreme Court decision that
recognized the inevitable discovery exception, analyzes its various
components, and briefly looks at how these components have been applied
by subsequent courts. The Article then separately explores two areas
which were not directly discussed in Nix: the utilization of the inevitable
discovery exception to avoid exclusion of primary evidence, and its
utilization to avoid the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
This Article will demonstrate that in these two areas the lower courts have
expanded the inevitable discovery exception beyond what was originally
envisioned by the Supreme Court in Nix, and that this expansion has
seriously affected the vitality of the exclusionary rule as well as the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. The article will further demonstrate that
this significant expansion has not received the concern or the analysis it
deserves.
11. Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
12: Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
13. Nix v. Wdiliams, 467 U.S. 431, 440 (1984).
14. Inevitable discovery has been called a "conceiptua extemion" of the srict independent source rule. Stephen H.
LaCount and Anthony J. Girese, The 'Inle wovery' Rule, an EvoMng Excepton to the Calitutionl Erclsion
Ride, 40 ALE. L. REV. 483, 485-86 (1976).
15. 467 u.s. 431 (1984).
19921
HeinOnline -- 20 Am. J. Crim. L. 81 1992-1993
AM. J. CRIM. L.
II. Nix Decision
The inevitable discovery exception had its genesis in Somer v. United
States.16 In Somer, police entered the defendant's premises unlawfully
and were informed by the defendant's wife that he was out, but that he
would be delivering the "stuff" and returning to the apartment shortly.1 7
After conducting a search of the apartment, the officers went outside and
waited for the defendant's arrival. Within a short period of time, the
defendant drove up and the police observed the "stuff" (alcohol and sugar)
in the car. Somer admitted to possession of alcohol and was arrested. The
alcohol and sugar were seized. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the
physical evidence, which the lower court granted. However, the Second
Circuit remanded to the lower court to retry the issue of evidence
admissibility, stating that the inquiry may show that "quite independently
[from the information unlawfully obtained from the defendant's wife] the
officers would have gone to the street, have waited for Somer and have
arrested him, exactly as they did. If... it appears that they did not need
the information, the seizure may have been lawful.""8 The circuit court
did not define this holding as an inevitable discovery, nor did it address it
in terms of the exception to the fruits doctrine.19
The inevitable discovery exception was first adopted by the Supreme
Court in Nix v. Williams,2' which involved the horrendous crime of
kidnapping and murdering a ten-year-old girl on Christmas Eve. The
police illegality in this case was a violation of the Sixth Amendment,21
and. a statement was obtained as a direct result of that violation. This
statement was the primary evidence, which led the police to the body of the
victim, the secondary evidence. Despite the clear causation between the
constitutional violation and the secondary evidence, the Court held that the
evidence of the body could be introduced because the body would
inevitably have been discovered.' The decision was based on a factual
16. 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1943).
17. Id. at 791.
18. Id. at792.
19. The term "Inevitable discovery" is generally traced to the 1974 Seventh Circuit decision in United States ex rel.
Owesm v. TBveey, 508 F.2d 858, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1974). The facts of Owen wvere such that the independent soureo rulo
could be used to avoid exclusion of evidence and the cout did, in fact, use that doctrine. The cott, howver, wesat further
and expressed approval ofthe "so-called inevitability test." Id. at 866.
20. 467 U.S. 431 (1994).
21. The police, by use of a psychological ploy (a Christian burial speech), obtained a stratement from the defendant after
his right to counsel bad attached. Since counsel bad attached this deliberate elicitaion of the s=temcat, it constitutad a
violation of the Sixth Amendment. See Messiah v. United State, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Court pointed out that the fruits
doctrine wee applicable to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment as well. Thus the inevilable discovery excepon bas applicability
beyond the Sixth Amendment. M, 467 U.S. at 442.
22. Ao the facts of ATx indicate, the inevitable discovery exception vws u&d to avoid the exclusion of a body, Le.
physical evidence. This factor was relied uxpo by the AlasIa Court of Appeal %ea it refused to apply the inevitablo
discovery exception to a statement, as opposed to physical evidence. Unger v. Strle, 640 P.2d 151 (Alska C App. 19M,
ovemded on other grouds by, Johnson v. Alasla, 662 P.2d 981, 984 (1933). The court hold that a statermct uus not the
[Vol 20:079
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determination by the lower court that a search party operating in the area
would have found the body had the search not been suspended. Thus, the
Court adopted the inevitable discovery exception to the fruits doctrine.
The Court, in adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine, compared it
to the independent source doctrine.' Justice Brennan, in his dissent, took
exception with the comparison to the independent source exception. He
pointed out that the independent source exception allows the prosecution to
use evidence that was in fact obtained by lawful means, whereas the
inevitable discovery doctrine deals with evidence which was discovered as
a result of an illegality.'
.The Nix Court, in determining the scope of the exclusionary rule for
secondary evidence, reasoned that the police should be put "in the same,
not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or
misconduct had occurred."2' In other words, if the police can establish
that they would have found the evidence regardless of the illegality, they
should not be put in a worse position simply because the illegality had, in
fact, taken place. It should be emphasized that the Court was directing this
comment to the derivative quality of the evidence and limited its comment
tp of evidence that would "be 'discovered' by legal, predictable police procedures." Id. at 159. Even though an arrest
of a defendart may have been inevitable, this does not necessarily mean a statement would have been obtained. Id. at
159.
The Michigan Cort of Appeals referred to Unger in People v. Thomas, 478 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Mich. C. App.
1991), ten, denied, 113 S. Ct. 297 (1992). The coert pointed out that it was just too speculative to know if the defendant,
at another time, would have made the same type of statement that had been made initially:
To conclude that a person would mal the same statement under differet circumstances requires, in essence,
both the ability to read the defendart'a mind to ascertain wy he was willing to male the statement in the
first place and a degree of prognostication concerning whether that willingness would extend to different
circumstances, which ordinarily would be beyond the power of either the prosecutor or the court to perform.
Id.. discussing Unger, 640 P.2d at 159. The Michigan cort agreed with Unger, although the court qualified its approval
by stating that the inevitable discovery excelion could be used for a statement, but it would have to be done in rather
maiaual circumstances. 478 N.W. 2d at 716.
For example, had, unbeknown to the arresting officers, another officer in the dep rtment obtained a warrant
for defendant's arrest and arrived at defendant's residence moments after the arrest was conducted without
a wirrart, it migbt be valid to conclude that there is no reasonable distinction between the arrest without
a warrat and an arrest a few moments later with the warrant and, therefore, any statements made by
defendant after the arrival of a warrant would be admissible.
Id. at 716 n4.
23. "There is a functional similarity between these two doctrines in thot exclusion of evidence that would inevitably
have been discovered would also put the govermmeut in a worse position, because the police would have obtained that
evidende if no misconduct had tak.n place." Ar, 467 U.S. at 443-45.
24. In its zealous efforts to emasculate the excluslonry rule, however, the Court loses siglt of
the crucial difference between the "inevitable discovery" doctrine and the "independert
source" exception from which it is derived. When properly applied, the "independent
source" exception allows the prosecution to use evidence only if it was, in fact, obtained by
fully lawful means. It therefore does no violence to the constitutionl protections that the
exclusionary rule is meant to enforce. The "inevitable discovery" exception is lewise
compatible with the Constton, though it differs in one ky respect from its next of 1 d
specifically, the evidence sough; to be introduced at trial is not actaily been obtained from
an independent source, but rarher would have been discovered as a maner of course if
independent investigations were allowed to proceed.
Id. at 459.
25. Id. at 443 (cmpliasis added).
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to that.26
It is interesting to note that the Court took a restorative approach to
the exclusionary rule, that is, police should not be put in a worse position
as a result of an illegality. To justify this approach, the Court pointed out
that in the inevitable discovery cases the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rule would not be served because the evidence would have
been found anyway.' However, this approach does not adequately
address the wrong that has occurred. It also deviates from the traditional
understanding of the exclusionary rule, where the state is put in a worse
position (by the loss of valuable evidence) whenever the exclusionary rule
applies. The rule is primarily designed to prevent future wrongs, not to
evaluate the present ramifications.2
In Nix, the Supreme Court established the "preponderance of
evidence"" as the burden of proof that the state must meet to establish the
inevitable discovery exception. A vast majority of jurisdictions follow this
evidentiary standard.30 The objective of the various burdens was to aid
the courts in their effort to make certain that the evidence would indeed be
found in the absence of unlawful police activity. For this reason, Justice
Brennan, in his dissent in Nix, argued for requiring a higher standard of
proof by the prosecution, due to the speculative aspect of the inevitable
26. Id. at 444; see United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Curreu2y, 955 F.2d 712, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (diseussing
Mx).
27. AMx, 467 U.S. at 444.
28. Woug San v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1963).
29. Mr, 467 U.S. at 444. Prior to Me, differeit standards were suggested for the brdcen of proof in the inevitable
discovry cases. Some cortas required the gover-mait to prove by "clear and convincing evidene" that the eidence would
have been fournd without the initial illegality. Jig., Government of Viegin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 927 (3rd Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Fain v. State, 611 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Ark 1981), q.Tiakoned in, Brunson v. Stale,
753 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 ("'Cestiy to our position in Fain, we now find that it is rot incumbeut that the stoe etblish good
fith conduct as to the accelerated discovery of the evidence...."); State v. Byrs, 595 S.W.2d 301, 305 (to, CL App.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980). Other jurisdictions stated that the polce End to show that they were actively
p the evidence through legal channels and tlt ther was a "reasonable probability" that the evidenco would bo
discoveed. E.g., United States v. Broolina, 614 F.2d 1037, 1048 (5th Cir. 1980); Heruadez v. Superior Court of
Sacramento County, 185 Cal. Rptr. 127, 132 (Cal. CL App 1910). The Second Circuit hld that the governent has to
prove by a "preponderance of evidence" that the eviden in question would be obtained through means other that the illegal
ones. United States v. Faley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Sceipani, 289 F. Spp. 43, 64 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), affld, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cet. denied, 397 U.S. 9222 (1970).
30. E.g., United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986); United State v. Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663,
683 (E.D. Tex. 1992); Commonwalh v. O'Connor, 546 N.R.2d 336, 339 (Mazs. 1939); State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d
181, 186 (Mo. CL App. 1990). There have been some variations adopted by severnl courts, whih have used terms rike
"reasonable probability." E.g., United Stat v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Ci'. 1935), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056
(1985); United S v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. dnied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1935); State v.
Perldus, 480 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Oio 1985). One satee cort follows a more flexible standard, oa wch varies with the
circumstances of each isalvideul case, and it se that O[when] the evidence i ,ell conecaled or timh is a critical factor,
the state will have to malas a more euct ahoeing of how or when the discovery would have occurred." State v. Miller,
709 P.2d 225, 243 (Or. 1985), cet. d ied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986). At lezt one Etete court does not accept tha
prepoaleaes of evidence" standard and requires 'clear and convinci g" evidnice, bit this requirement is directly tied
to the application of the inevitable discovery to prisry, as well as secotay evidence. Stdo v. Sugar, 495 A.Nd 90, 104
(N.J. 1985), cert. d ned, 584 A.2d 247 (N.J. 1990); see a/so State v. Johnson, 576 A.2d 834, 848-49 (N.J. 1990); State
v. Hail, 60 A.2d 1248, 1251-52 (N.J. Super. 1990), affd, 600 A.2d 1221 (N.J. Super. 1991). Sec noa text accompanying
now 82-85.
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discovery exception." He argued for a "clear and convincing" standard,
as opposed to the "preponderance of evidence" standard adopted by the
majority.32
To counter Justice Brennan's argument, the majority sought to reduce
the speculative aspect of the exception by requiring that the alternative
investigation must have at least been started for the exception to apply.
They stated that the inevitable discovery exception "involves no speculative
elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts."33 This approach
was consistent with the facts of Nix, in which police were in the process
of scouring the roadside when the body was found. This Article explores
this aspect in greater detail when it looks at the effect of the inevitable
discovery exception on the warrant requirement.'
Prior to Nix, the Supreme Court had recognized the importance of
good faith when considering the exceptions to the fruits doctrine. In
Brown v. Illinois,35 the Court, in determining the thrust of the fruits
doctrine, stated that "the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct
[is particularly] relevant."36 Later on, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Ceccolini37 analyzed the "attenuation of the taint" doctrine as it
applied to the finding of live witnesses. There the Court indicated "that
considerations relating to the exclusionary rule and the constitutional
principles which it is designed to protect must play a part in this attenua-
tion" analysis."3" It further indicated that the flagrancy of the illegality
was an important factor in determining whether the application of the
exclusionary rule would have a deterrent effect.39
Nix was a departure from these good faith concerns.4' In Nix, the
31. Mr, 467 U.S. at 459-60.
32. Id. at 459.
33. Id. at 444 n.5.
34. See infia text accompanying notes 93-147.
35. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
36. Id. at 604-05.
37. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
38. Id. at 279.
39. Id. at 279-80; jee aLw Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) ('The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule necessarily assumes that he police have engaged in willfil, or at the very least negligeat, conduct wtich has deprived
the defendant of some rigt. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instll in
those particular investigating officers, or in their future courtearts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an
accused. Where the official action vw pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence ratiomle loses much of its
force.").
40. Prior to /dx. theme was a limited number of jurisdictions weich addressed the element of "good faith" in the
applics on of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Some courts mentioned the 'good falith" factor in pasing. See e.g., United
Rtes v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 65 C2d Cir. 1981) (stressing officer's good faith in txying to comply with warnut
requiremenat), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 839 (1981); StaWe v. Holler, 459 A.2d 1143, 1147 (N.H. 1983) (asserting that the
element of good faith on the part of police is inherent in the inevitable discovery); People v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App.
3d. 665, 683 (Cal. CL App. 1978) (reasoning tht an inquiry into police officer's good faith would serve the iterest of
jutice). Other courts followed the approach taken by the lowe Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 260
(Iowa 1979), cert. doled, 446 U.S. 921 (1980), rey'd, 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983) (holdin that the factual proof was
not sufficient for the state to fall under the 'inevitable discovery" rule and reversing on facts only), rev'd, Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984), whrere the government was required to show an 'abec=e of bod-faith" in order for the inevitable
discovery doctrine to apply. See e.g., Fain v. State, 611 S.W.2d 508, 509 (Arki. 1981) (imposing a "good faith"
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notion of a good faith requirement was rejected by the Court, as it did not
require the state to show an absence of bad faith. 1 The Court went
through a balancing test, weighing the costs of imposing a good faith
requirement on the state with whatever deterrence benefit might result. It
concluded that to require the state to show an absence of bad faith would
impose a huge societal cost, because it would deprive juries of truthful
facts, as well as put the police in a worse position 2 The Court found
that the use of the inevitable discovery exception would have a limited
deterrent effect because a police officer "would rarely if ever be in a
position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be
discovered." 4' He would therefore avoid any questionable practices
which might result in suppression of the evidence, as well as departmental
sanctions and civil liability.' However, the Court seems short-sighted in
this conclusion, especially with regard to avoiding the warrant require-
ment.45
requirement); State v. Byrne, 595 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Mo. CL App. 1979) (requidrg "good faith" on te pst of governet
for inevitable discovery to apply), ce. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); State v. PeIps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 775 (N.D. 19-0)
(holding that the "me of doctrine is permitted only when police have not acted in bad faith"). Howzver, the Meix decision
led some state corts, which originally had a good-faith requirement, to reject or to question it. E.g. Bruasson v. Wao, 753
S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Ask. 1988) (holding Faiz good faith requirement no loer necessary); Stato v. Cormeau, 781 P.2d
1159, 1168 (N.M. CL App. 1989) (questioning earlier decision requiring absence of bad faith in Ii of T decision).
41. 467 U.S. at 445.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 446.
45. Despite the Ae decision, some courts Lave considered the flagrancy of tha violation in a"sming whether to apply
the inevitable discovery exception. At least one court interpreted Ae to mean not that the preaence of irtcntioml misconduct
is irrelevant, only that the govermment does not have to prove an absence of bad faith. Fortier v. Stain, 515 So. 2d 101,
111-12 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), cert. derted, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). A number of state counts felt that tho inevitable
discovery doctrine would lead to unconstitational short cuts, thereby defceating the deterrence effect of tho exclMuionry rule.
These couts have reasoned that a "good faith" requirement would avoid this effect. Thin, as a precondition to the we of
the inevitable discovery excepion, these courts require that tha state prove that the police have not acted in bad faith by
accelerating the discovery of evidece. Smith v. State, 531 A.2d 302 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1937), cen. granted, 537 A.2d
262 (1988); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336 (Mass. 1989); State v. Coreao, 781 P.2d 1159 (N.M. CL App.
1989); State v. Wabl, 450 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1990). Other states, however, Iive explicitly agreed with the Nx rejzc-ton
of a good faith requirement or have followed it without discassion. See e.g., Baker v. State, 555 So. 2d 273 (Ala,
Cries. App. 1989); Brason v. State, 753 S.W.2d 859 (Ark. 1988).
The Model Code of Pro-Arraignment Procedure, § 290.2(5) (1975) woud seem to support tha "good faith"
reqairement. The Code sets out two requirements for the state to avoid the supprsion of 'fruits." First, thz state must
prove that evidence would have been discovered anyway (inevitable discovery). Id. Second, it hs to be chown "that
exclusion of such evidence is not necessary to deter violation of this code." Id. It is thie language thnt wo ld seem to
impliciltly establish a "good faith" requirement.
. Brent R. Appel, Deputy Atomy General, Depeasent of Justice, Des Moines, lowa and attorney for tho eate of
lowa in AV v. Wil/iawr, suggests tit "[i]n oder to prevent police officers from wing dependett inevablo discovery m
a bootstmp to introduce evidence, the state should generally be required to shov 'absence of bad faith' in order to avado
the bite of tsa exclusionary rule." Brent R. Appel, 7ire Inevitable Di overj E cq:or to hie E cl ,/srary Rule, 21 CRIM.
L. BUIJ.. 101, 116 (1985).
Some courts have looked at the severity of the constitutional violation in nsewig whether or not to apply the
inevilable discovery exception to primary as well as secondary evidence. E.g., Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 NB,2d
336, 340 (Mass 1989); Commonwealth v. Beneit, 415 N.R.2d 818, 823 (Mass. 1981). Oth-r courts, when faced with an
Lnte'iona bypass of the Fourth Amendment wvnrant requirement, have not applied inevitable discovery. E.g., State v.
Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. deried, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); Fomder v. Srio, 515 So. 2d 101. 112
(Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (construing United Rt v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (Sth Cir. 1985), cert. deried, 479 U.S.
1056 (1985)); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W. 26 625, 629 (N.D.1981). The Firut Circuit, in its desire to avoid the active
pursuit'requareet of AEr, seems to have, at leest implicitly, odopted a good fith requirement by requiring a determination
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III. Expansion to Primary Evidence
Most of the circuits have utilized the inevitable discovery exception to
allow the introduction of primary evidence, and this has usually been done
without any discussion.4 United States v Mancera-Londono,47 in facts
similar to United States Currency,' presents a good example of a circuit
utilizing the inevitable discovery exception to avoid exclusion of the
primary evidence. The case involved an illegal search of an automobile in
which primary evidence was found. Due to an inventory procedure which
would have uncovered the evidence, exclusion was avoided by the use of
the inevitable discovery exception.49 The court did not discuss the
appropriateness of the use of inevitable discovery for primary evidence; it
just automatically applied it.
Following the lead of the circuits, states have started to apply the
inevitable discovery exception to primary as well as secondary evidence,
and generally this has also been done without any discussion.50 In New
Jersey, the court explicitly allowed application of the inevitable discovery
rule. to primary evidence, but it created a more stringent stan-
dard-"restrictive formulation of the inevitable discovery exception."51
This formulation imposes a "clear and convincing"52 burden of proof on
the prosecution, a higher standard than the "preponderance of the
evidence" standard adopted by Supreme Court in Nix.53
The expansion to primary evidence of the inevitable discovery
of xtiet ir "the application of the inevitable discovery excqtion either provide an ineative for police misconduct or
signifiztcly weale [F]ourth [A]mendment prcteion." United Statts v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 744 (Ist Cir. 1986), cer.
daied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1986). This is an indication that the courts should comider whether use of the inevitable discovery
exception will encourage police misconduct. See abo United States v. Rulle, 748 F. Supp. 36, 44 (D. Mass. 1990)
(reviewing test for police misconduct in context of inevitability and irdependence).
46. Se United Statcs v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (lIst Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1233 (1986); United States
v. Whithehor, 813 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237 (1988); United Stat v. Mango, 879 F.2d 1501,
1506-07 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989), cet. deried, 493 U.S. 1069 (1989); United States v. Amnrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Herendez-Cano, 808 F,2d 779, 784 (11th Cir.), cen. denid, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
The Second Circuit specifically addressed the issue of the application of the inevitable discovery excepion to
pnmary, as wll as secondary evidence. The Ci-cuit clmcterized inevitable discovery as an exception to the exetluioa-y
rule, rather than an exception to the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine. United States v. Pimeatel, 810 F.2d 366, 368-69
(2d Cir. 1987). Thus, explicitly, as well as in its amlysis of the facts of an individual cas, the Second Circuit does not
distinguish between primary and secondary evidence. United States v. Gorslde, 852 F.2d 692 (2Zd Cir. 1988); Wastehorn,
829 F.2d at 1232; United StRe v. Taddeo, 724 F. Supp. 81, 87 (W.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 932 F.2d 956 (1991) ("Second
Circuit hau expressly rejected the direct-indirect evidence distinction.*).
47. 912 F.2d 373 (9th Cit. 1990).
48. United St v. $639,558.00 in United Stat Currenry, 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
49. Macera-Londono, 912 F.2d at 375-76.
50. State v. Ortiz, 542 A.2d 734 (Coon. App. CL 1988), cmrt. denied, 548 A.2d 441 (1988); State v. Hara, 542 A.2d
794 (Del. Super. CL 1988), rev'd o other grounds, 591 A.2d 158 (Del. 1991); State v. Vinck, 436 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa
1989); State v. Waddell, 784 P.2d 381 (Kan CL App. 1989); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 N.E.2d 336 (Mass. 1989);
People v. Kroll, 446 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. CL App. 1989); Clough v. State, 555 P.2d 840 (Nov. 1976); State v. Casimono,
593 A.2d 827 (N.J. Super. CL App. Div. 1991), ce,?. denied, 112 S. CL 1978 (1992); State v. Jolmson, 576 A.2d 834 (N.J.
1990); State v. Weber, 471 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1991), reconsideration denied, 476 N.W.2d 867 (1991).
51, State v. Sugar, 495 A.2d 90, 102 (N.J. 1985).
52. Id. at 104.
53. Nix v. William, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
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exception occurring in the circuit courts and the state courts potentially has
great ramifications on the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule.'
To analyze this trend properly, it is useful to have an understanding of the
Supreme Court's approach to the exclusionary rule.
Over time, the Court, in continuing to apply the exclusionary rule to
address police illegality, has concluded that its only benefit is to deter
police misconduct. 5 "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it."56
Through a balancing test which is utilized to determine whether to
apply the exclusionary rule in a particular context, the Court has imple-
mented its deterrence rationale. This test balances the benefit of deterrence
with the societal costs of suppressing reliable evidence. When the costs of
exclusion outweigh the benefits of deterrence, the exclusionary rule is not
applied.' In applying this balancing test, the Court has been especially
cognizant of the deterrence benefit resulting from excluding primary
evidence at a criminal trial from the prosecution case in chief, and it has
been reluctant to create exceptions to the exclusionary rule in this context.
For example, in Stone v. Powell,58 the Court specifically indicated that the
54. The close relationship of the inevitable diseovery exception to the exclmionamy rle and is potecntial effect on the
rule was briefly discussed in 1974 by the Fifth Circuit in U.S. v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cit. 1974), ndfid,
500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). (-To admit unlawfully obtained evidence on the frength of some judgo's
speculati n that it would have been discovered legally anyway would be to crippo the exelsloaary rule as a dctrrcnt to
m police conduct.).
55. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ('The primary jastificetion for the exclusionary rule then is the
deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment rights."); United calis v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 44647 (1976)
("[T]be 'prime parpose' of the rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future tmhfdi police conduc'" (quoling United ate
v. CaLanda, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)).
56. n v. United Stat s, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
57. The balancing test hs been applied in diffeamit cootexts, usually to avoid the scope of the exclusionary nile. For
example, United St v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), held that the exclusicuary rule VMs not applicable for grand jury
proceedings. Also, in United States v. ads, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), evidence illegally obtained %us admitted for civil (aj
opposed to criminl) proceedings. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1975), tle exclosionay remedy review was limited
during a habeas corpus proceeding. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in United Starer v. Lean, hd this to sy about the so-
called balancing approach-
The Court seeks to justify this result on the ground that the "costs" of adhering to the exclosionry rile in
cases hie those before us exceed the "benefits." But the angaue of dterrene and of co t/benfit analysis,
if used indiscriminately, can have n mrcotic effect. It creates an iluion of techn!cal pmcision and
ineluctability. It suggests that not only constitutioml principle but also empirical e support the majority's
result. When the Cous amlysis is examind carefully, however, it is clear that we have not been tr ed
to an honest assneme t of the merits of the exelusiorasy rile, but have irtead been drown into a curious
world where the 'costs" of excladlig illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggereted heigts and whco the
"benefits" of such exclusion ae made to disappear with a mere wave of thz hand.
468 U.S. W7, 929 (1984). And again, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369 (1985), Justice Brenman in dissecnt
suited:
All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief neds by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian
calculu while the Court in fact engagea in an unanlyzed exereise ofjudicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally
destructive nihilism is merely a convenient umbrella -e whh a majctit that cannot agreo on a genne
rationale can concea its differences.
469 U.S. at 369.
58. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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deterrent rationale had its greatest benefit for the suppression of evidence
at the trial stage.59
Even in United States v. Leon, where the Court created a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule for the exclusion of evidence in the
prosecution case in chief, the Court took a narrow view as to what would
amount to a good faith exception.6' The Court limited the good faith
exception to those instances where the officer conducts a search pursuant
to a warrant:
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the
police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as
a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating
officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights
of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith,
however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force."
6
'
In short, where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, "excluding the
evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way;
for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer
would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no
way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his
duty." 62
The Court, in creating this narrow exception, continued to recognize
the vitality of the exclusionary rule by pointing out that "[tihe Court has,
to be sure, not seriously questioned, 'in the absence of a more efficacious
sanction, the continued application of the rule to suppress evidence from
the [prosecution's] case where a Fourth Amendment violation has been
substantial and deliberate."' 63
The Court has recognized, in its employment of the exclusionary rule,
a distinction between primary and secondary evidence.64 The concern for
limiting the exceptions to the exclusionary doctrine during the prosecution's
case, especially with regard to primary evidence, has permeated the
Court's analysis of the exceptions to the fruits doctrine. In applying the
attenuation of the taint exception, the Court has examined how closely the
secondary evidence is tied to the primary evidence in order to determine
59. ld. at 493.
60. 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
61. Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).
62. Id. at 919-20 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 539-540 (White, L, dissen,).
63. Id. at 908-09 (altsartion in origial) (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)); see also Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. at 492 (assuming tint exclusion deters law enforcemect officen from wrongful conduct and noting tint
exclusion encomages officers to incorporte the Fourth Amendment into their lu system).
64. The distinction between the deterrent effect on primnary and secondary evidence um discussed in dicta in Segum
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984), a case decided just prior to Leon. In Segum, the Court irnflieted tht "evidence
obtained as a direct result of an uncounsittional search and seizure is plainly subject to the exclusion.* Id. (emphasis
added). Since t e primary evidenc issue wa not litigated in Segu, the Cotut's recognition of the diff-erences bete n
primary and secondary evidence and its effect on the exclusion of evidence is only dicta. In tris way the court ias implicitly
recognized a difference between primary and secondary evidence.
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the benefits from the use of the exclusionary rule. The point at which the
taint becomes attenuated has been viewed as "the point of diminishing
returns" of the deterrence principle,65 at which point the detrimental
consequences of the illegal police action no longer justify the cost of
exclusion. This proposition was also emphasized in Wong Sun v. United
States:66 "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial all
physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a result of an
unlawful invasion."67 The Court has indicated that one would have to
analyze each factual situation and determine how closely tied the contested
evidence was to the illegality.68 Where there is a close causal connection
between the illegality and the secondary evidence, the exclusionary remedy
would be most efficacious. However, if the causal connection is sufficient-
ly attenuated, an exception to the exclusionary rule would be appropriate.
Thus, in both the application of the fruits doctrine as well as in the creation
of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the court has shown sensitivity and
indeed reluctance to limiting the exclusionary remedy for primary
evidence.
The Nix decision, which established the inevitable discovery exception
and to date remains the only Supreme Court case which directly deals with
this exception, presents a strong argument for limiting this exception to
secondary evidence as it involved facts that dealt with the exclusion of
secondary evidence.69 In its analysis, the Court referred to suppression
of "tainted" fruit,'70 and the cases cited in this context involved the excep-
tions to the fruits doctrine."' Further, the Court, in its discussion of the
exclusionary rule, once again referred exclusively to the secondary
evidence.' Thus, based upon the facts, as well as the rationale of Nix,
the Court's attention understandably was focused exclusively on secondary
evidence. There was no discussion of the effect of this exception on
primary evidence.
At least one circuit has subsequently utilized the Nix decision to limit
explicitly the inevitable discovery doctrine to secondary evidence. In
United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency,' in facts similar to
Mancera-Londono,74 the government sought to use an inevitable inventory
search to justify a warrantless discovery of primary evidence. The case
65: Anthony G. Amsternam, Search, Seizre, and &con 2255: A Contaa, 112 U. PA. L. R9V. 378, 390 (1964).
66. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
67. ld. at 485.
68. Id.
69. Nix v. W'llnims, 467 U.S. 431, 434 (1984).
70. ld. at 441.
71. Id. at 441-42 (referring to Silverthorra Lumnber Co. v. United State, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) and Wong Sim v.
United State, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
72. Id. at 442-43.
73. 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
74. 912 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1990).
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involved a warrantless search of luggage which resulted in the finding of
evidence. Since there was an existing inventory procedure,75 the govern-
ment argued that the evidence in the luggage would have been found
anyway.
76
The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, stating that Nix was limited
to derivative evidence: "Whatever one may think of the distinction
[between primary and secondary evidence], the fact remains that Nix drew
it, and did so for the purpose of demonstrating that the deterrent effects of
the exclusionary rule would not be lessened."77 The D.C. Circuit
admitted, however, that many circuits have "either rejected or ignored any
distinction between primary and derivative evidence, as well as the
deterrence inquiry called for by Nix."78
In some states, the distinction between primary and secondary
evidence has been explicitly recognized by the courts for some time. As
early as State v. Crosen,79 inevitable discovery has been applied only to
purge the taint of secondary, not primary, evidence. Subsequent to Nix,
some of the state courts, through the use of their own laws, have been even
more vigilant in limiting the use of inevitable discovery exclusively to
secondary evidence.'0
.In New York, the courts have interpreted the state constitutional
provisions so as to ensure that the use of the inevitable discovery exception
is limited to secondary evidence.81 In Oregon, the appeals court has
turned to a state statute that codified the fruits of the poisonous tree
75. This is a police procedure used to safegmar valuables and other property while, an individual is in police custody
or vwhen an automobile is seized by the police.
76. U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d at 714.
77. Id. at 720. For a different treatment of Atx, see United States v. MeConnell, 903 F.2d 566, 570 (Sth Cir. 1990)
(holding tha the prima y evidence seized from an illegally opened briefcase was held admissible), cert. dend, 111 S. CL
1393 (1991).
78. 955 F.2d at 720.
79. 536 P.2d 1263 (Or. CL App. 1975); see also Hesmmdez v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 110 Cal. App.
3d 355, 361 (3d Dist. 1973) (holding the the inevitable discovery exception applies only to evidence obtained as the indirect
product of an illegal search); State v. Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (OAd. CL App. 1st Dist. 1988) (holding that the
evidence foumd in defendat's house was primacy evidence and teint could not be removed, even if the state proved that
evidence would have been discovered legally).
80. As the Burger Supreme Court cut back on individual rigts during 197, some states utilized their owa
constitutional provisions to provide greater rigits to the individual. This strategy was promoted by Justice Brenuan in &ae
C aitolow nd the Protetion of hvidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). See aLso Robert F. Utter, &te
Canoitwionaj Law, 7he United Stares Supreme Court, and Daocrtic Accountabiity, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 27 (1989)
("Mor than 450 published state court opinons interpret state constiteuios as going beyond federal constitutional
guactdes.').
81. E.g., People v. Solano, 539 N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. Div. 1989). New York presets a good example ofa state count
that has specifically limited the use of inevitable discovery to secoudary evidence. This distinction was originally mentioned
in People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987):
When inevitable discovecry rule is applied to secondary evidence... the effect is not to excuse the unlawful
police actions by -dmt what was obtained as a direct result of initial misconduct ... . When the
inevitable discovery rule is applied to primary evidence ... the result is quite different .... [It] amounts
to an after the fact purging of initial wrongful conduct.
This has been coninuously followed by subsequent courts. E.g., People v. Silver, 577 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div. 1991);
New York v. Laviera, 543 N.Y.S. 2d 788 (App. Div. 1989); People v. Myers, 537 N.Y.S.2d 389 (App. Div. 1989); People
v. Herman, 533 N.Y.S.2d 971 (App. Div. 1988); People v. Okam, 522 N.Y.S.2d 991 (App. Div. 1987).
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doctrine and interpreted the language of the statute, which reads "as a
result of [an unlawful] search or seizure, other evidence is discovered
subsequently," to mean that the inevitable discovery exception applies only
to secondary, as opposed to primary, evidence.' The Texas Court of
Appeals, although it does not explicitly discuss the use of the inevitable
discovery exception for primary evidence, implicitly indicates that its
application is limited to secondary evidence, because the court classifies the
inevitable discovery as an exception to the fruits of the poisonous tree
doctrine.'
On the other side of the ledger, Murray v. United States,4 an
independent source decision, has provided support for excluding primary
evidence via the inevitable discovery exception. This is not surprising,
given the previously discussed close relationship between the independent
source exception and the inevitable discovery exception. Murray has been
cited for the proposition that there is no distinction to be drawn between
primary and secondary evidence, at least with regard to the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule.' In Murray, federal agents performed an illegal
warrantless search, which resulted in the discovery of bales of marijuana
(primary evidence, as it was the direct result of an illegality). The federal
agents left the bales untouched and then got a warrant based upon
previously obtained evidence, evidence which was separate and distinct
from the discovery of the marijuana. The same agents executed the
warrant some eight hours after the initial entry and seized the previously
discovered marijuana. 6 The majority of the Court, in a decision by
Justice Scalia, allowed for the introduction of the bales, despite the illegal
initial search, provided that the lawful entry with the warrant was based
upon information not related to the initial entry.' The majority refused
to distinguish between primary and secondary evidence.88 This reasoning,
coupled with the previously mentioned close relationship between the
inevitable discovery doctrine and the independent source doctrine, 9 has
invited lower courts to utilize the Murray decision to support the use of the
82. State v. SIefdlhorn, 769 P.2d 221, 224 (Or. C. App. 1989) (emphssi in orgin).
83. Reed v. Texas, 809 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). In a recent decision, the Tons Court of Crimiml
Appeals, in interpreting a state statnte, found that the inevitable discovery excepion was not an excepion to tho Texas
exeluionary rule and therefore refused to apply it. Garcia v. Texas, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Pex. Crim. App. 1992).
84. 487 U.S. 533 (1988). It should be pointed out that Murray -as a 4-to-3 decision wi h Justiees Brenna and
Kenne4y -t participting.
85. E.8 ., United States v. $639,558.00 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ('IThe Murray Court]
rejected the argument tha a different result ws compelled because primary, not derivative, evidence was involved.'); Pceplo
v. Schoodm mrl4 759 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo. 1988) (en hone) (holding that bosed on the Murray rationl, primary evidence
may be aslmtd if government proves that warrant would have been obtained absent information gained by initial llegality).
86. 487 U.S. at 535.
87. Id. at 54l.
88. Id. Justice Scalia choanterized SUverthome, the ca which, as previously mentioned, esbablIblaed the indeenent
somee excetion, as 'referring specifically to [primary] evidence seized during an unlawful search.' Id.
89. 'The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements is in reality an extrapolation from the indepealent
source doctrine." Id. at 539.
[V/ol 20:079
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inevitable discovery exception to avoid exclusion of primary evidence.
As indicated, support can be found for either applying inevitable
discovery to primary evidence or limiting its use exclusively to secondary
evidence. On one hand, the Court's sensitivity to limiting exceptions to the
exclusionary rule during the prosecution's case in chief, as expressed
throughout Leon,' its efforts to limit exceptions to the fruits doctrine
when the secondary evidence is closely tied to the primary evidence, and
the benefits of deterrence when dealing with the direct result of the
illegality, argue persuasively for limiting the inevitable discovery exception
to secondary evidence. In addition, the Nix decision was specifically
limited by its facts and analysis to secondary evidence.91
On the other hand, the Murray decision, recognizing the close
relationship between the independent source rule and the inevitable
discovery exception, provides support for expansion of the inevitable
discovery exception to primary evidence:
It is possible to read petitioner's brief as asserting the more narrow position that
the "independent source" doctrine does apply to independent acquisition of
evidence previously derived indirectly from the unlawful search, but does not
apply to what they call "primary evidence," that is, evidence acquired during the
course of the search itself. In addition to finding no support in our precedent,
[citing Silverthorne] . . .this strange distinction would produce results bearing no
relation to the policies of the exclusionary rule. It would mean, for example, that
the government's knowledge of the existence and condition of a dead body,
knowledge lawfully acquired through independent sources, would have to be
excluded if government agents had previously observed the body during an
unlawful search of the defendant's apartment; but not if they had observed a
notation that the body was buried in a certain location, producing consequential
discovery of the corpse.
92
Given the ramifications that the use of the inevitable discovery
exception has on the exclusionary rule, it seems that courts should, at least,
recognize that they are using it to exclude primary evidence, and discuss
this expansion, rather than applying it automatically. It further should be
recognized that this expansion is beyond Nix, the only Supreme Court case
dealing directly with the inevitable discovery exception.
90. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see .mr notes 59-63 and accompain text.
91. A fallm to exclude primary evidence would hl dile the exclmonmry rule deterrence effect:
[Falling to exchale prinmry evidence is] an after-the-fact purging of the inia wrongful conduct, and it can
never be chimed that a lapse of time or the occurrence of itevenig events hu attenuated the connecti n
between the evidence ultinmtely acqnired and the initial miscooducL The illegad conduct and the seizure of
the evidence are one and the same.
People v. Stuh, 506 N.E.2d 911, 914 (N.Y. 1987).
92. Murmy v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540-41 (1988).
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I'. Warrant Requirement
A. Overview
-The Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement provides a useful buffer between the police officer and the
individual.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.
93
Given this important objective, the Court has, at times, limited the
opportunities for warrantless police activity.94 "It is a cardinal principle
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the search falls
within the few specifically established and well delineated exceptions."95
Nevertheless, the Court, as pointed out by Justice Scalia, has "lurched back
and forth between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and looking
to reasonableness alone."' He further points out that "the 'warrant'
requirement [has] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically
unrecognizable."'
The deeds of the Supreme Court would support Scalia's observation,
as the Court has been liberal in its expansion of the exceptions to the
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. By extending the existing
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Court has expanded on the
opportunities for warrantless police activity. For example, in Florida v.
Jimeno,9' the Court expanded on the scope of a consent search, one of the
traditional ways avoiding warrants, and in California v. Acevedo99 it
expanded the automobile exception to the warrant requirement by allowing
for a search of containers." 0 As this Article will demonstrate, the
93. Johnmon v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (194).
94. See 8eneraly, Robert M. Bloom, Warrwra Requiremert-77w Burger Covl Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. RH0. 691
(1932) (-*lzing the history of -~m requiremets.
95. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); noted in Califona v. Acevedo, 111 S. CL 1932, 1991 (1991)
(holding tit the cardim principle staed in M'.zcq rxeyai true).
96. Acevedo, 111 S. CL at 1992 (Scalia, J. concting).
97. Id.
98. 111 S. CL 1901 (1991) (holding that when a motori t gives an officer Permission to search his cm for narcotics,
the scope of the search may extend to anywhere in the vehicle where narcotics may bo Widden, including a closed cota!=e).
99. 111 S. CL 1982 (1991).
100. Id. at 1991. Prior to Acevedo, the police could search a codair found in a car only if they bad probable causo
to sarch th- entire car. If probable cause was limited to the container the conininer could be scized lit net opened until
a vrrant v obtained. United Stes v. Ros, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Acevedo allowed for the mmntless search of the
codai=er vitbot regard for the extent of probale camue. 111 S. C. at 1991.
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utilization of the inevitable discovery exception further limits the use of the
already limited warrant requirement.
B. Inevitable Discovery
The Nix Court, in discounting the negative effect that the inevitable
discovery exception would have on the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rule, stated in reference to the police that "there would be
little to gain from taking any dubious shortcuts to obtain the evidence."101
The Court naively felt that a police officer who is about to obtain evidence
in an illegal manner would not be able to calculate whether the evidence
would have inevitably been discovered. Because the Nix decision dealt
with a Sixth Amendment violation, the Court probably was not focusing on
the effect this exception would have on the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. To the extent that the Nix Court concluded that there would
be a limited deterrence effect by utilizing the inevitable discovery
exception, its reasoning was flawed with regard to the warrant requirement.
The exclusionary rule provides an incentive for the police to follow
the law. When exceptions to the exclusionary rule are created, the result
is to remove the incentive. The exceptions created thus far, by way of the
balancing previously mentioned, have, at least arguably, done little to
remove the incentive to follow the law."° For example, as the Court
pointed out in Leon, if the police did everything they thought they needed
to do, no incentives would be removed because in hindsight they would
have done things in the same way.103 However, the existence of the
inevitable discovery exception will provide the police with an incentive to
avoid the warrant requirement. The police might seek the most expeditious
method of obtaining the evidence without regard to its illegality, knowing
that, as long as they could have obtained the evidence legally, their efforts
will not result in its suppression. This approach will indeed affect the
deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule as it will encourage the police
to take procedural shortcuts rather than to comply with the law." 4 For
example, if the police can demonstrate that they could have gotten a search
warrant, what incentive will there be for them to go actively through the
procedural hassle of actually obtaining one, since the effects of an illegal
warrantless search could be nullified by the application of the inevitable
discovery exception?1"
101. Nix v. Wdlliams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984).
102. One of the components of the bilanci test is the amount of deerrent benefit to be served by the exclusionary
role.
103. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-21 (1984).
104. See M1, 467 U.S. at 457 (Stever, ., concurin).
105. As LaFave poins out in his treatise, the removal of incentives to comply with the law is not limited to sitalions
w'en *an Megal confirming search can detennine wheeher obtaining awant is worth the bother, snd the only way to deter
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United States Currency is illustrative of this point."6  This case
involved an illegal warrantless search of luggage in which the government
sought to avoid ,the iscope of the exclusionary rule by arguing the "cash,
keys and ledgers""°7 would have been discovered through an existing
inventory procedure. The court, in rejecting the government argument,
accurately pointed out:
In the vast run of'cases, there would be no incentive whatever for police to go to
the trouble of seeking a warrant (or, we should add, of waiting for a lawful
inventory to occur during normal processing). The police could readily make this
assessment on their own. Contrary to what Arx supposed, they would almost
invariably be in a position "to calculate whether the evidence ... would
inevitably have been discovered," because they would know that inventory
procedures were in place. 
108
This concern for the effect of the inevitable discovery exception on the
warrant requirement has been articulated by some state courts. To allow
for inevitable discovery to be utilized to sanctify an otherwise illegal search
due to a lack of a warrant would undermine the warrant requirement. 0 9
A police officer with the requisite justification to obtain a warrant might be
encouraged to avoid the chore of obtaining a search warrant1 ° when he
can obtain the evidence faster and more easily by an illegal (warrantless)
search and still have the evidence introduced by way of inevitable
discovery. For this reason, as well as the concern that the inevitable
discovery exception would conflict with the deterrent rationale of the
exclusionary rule, some states have eliminated the inevitable discovery
exception when it is used to avoid the need for a warrant.
Were the rule otherwise, every warrantless nonexigent seizure automatically
would be legitimized by assuming the hypothetical alternative that a warrant had
been obtained. Without the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, in such
circumstances the constitutional warrant procedure for shielding Americans from
unreasonable searches and seizures would be a shambles.111
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the impact that
such, calculated umconsthutional action is to 'pct the police in a worse position.'" 4 LA FAVE, suprn le 7, at 383.
106. United Stae v. $639,558.00 in United -St Currency, 955 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
107. Id. at 714.
108. U.S. Curre-.y, 955 F.2d at 721 (quoting AW, 467 U.S. at 446).
109. People v. Burr, 514 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (N.Y. 19M7), cert. dedd, 485 U.S. 9S9 (1938).
110. This chore inclxes: writing up an affidavi, finding a judge or magitrate, and executirg the vmat as directed
and in a timely fashion.
111. People v. Knapp, 439 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1981); .8. Commonwenlth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Mass.
1981) (rejecting the idea that a warmatles earch can be upheld bemuse a search irrsut could hove been obfained) cited
with approval in Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 546 N.B.2d 336, 338-39 (Mac. 1939); Stude v. Hancan, 437 N.W.2d
830, 838 (N.D. 1989) (declining to extend the inevifable discovery doctrine wlxcr the st atscrted that it would have
obtained a %slid %m and EsUoequey discovered the evidence, bemuse it would 'render tho vrent pcrc on of the
Fourth Amendemen eaningles); Burr, 514 N.E.2d at 1367 (allowing police to eareh first gad otain vrrmat lIer 4wsdM
undermine the very purpose of uwrrsat requirement'). How ver, it should be pointed out that some tates have allowed
for the inevitable diacovery exception even wzen it avoids the vwarrnt requiremneL E.g., State v. Storer, 583 A.2d 1016
(Me. 1990); Commonwealth v. Aeiondo, 580 A.2d 341 (Pa. Super. CL 1990).
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inevitable discovery might have on the warrant requirement, there is at
least some indication by the Court that this factor is not viewed as a
problem. Murray has been used to support the proposition that inevitable
discovery can be used even wlere it would sanction warrantless activi-
ty." The facts of Murray indicate that there was an illegal warrantless
search performed prior to the obtaining of a lawful warrant."3 The
Court allowed the introduction of the initially illegally discovered evidence
because it was subsequently discovered by lawful means." ' The majority
refused to consider the effect that the initial illegal warrantless search
would have had on the officers if nothing illegal was found.1 ' Or to
state it more graphically-why bother with a warrant if it will turn up
nothing? Due to their concern for the warrant requirement, dissenting
Justices Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor argued for a broader notion of
independence in order to be certain that the illegal warrantless search
would have no whatever effect on a decision to seek a warrant. "The
Court's ... holding lends itself to easy abuse, and offers an incentive to
bypass the constitutional requirement that probable cause be assessed by a
neutral and detached magistrate before the police invade an individual's
privacy. " 116
The circuit courts generally have been less sensitive to the effect that
the inevitable discovery doctrine may have on the warrant requirement." 7
112. See United States v. Saez, 719 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ('even though the agent's entry and
security sweep were illegal oh bsita, the hems discovered ... are nevertheless admissible because they inevitably would
have been discovered when the v id warrant was executed'), afd, 962 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1992). In a cas factuatly similar
to Murray, a Utah appeals court did not lmit the Mumy ratiowle to the independent soce exception, but also encompassed
inevitable discovery and allowed for illegal warmtless seizu to be avoided by the inevitable discovery exception. Stte
v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Utah App. 1988).
10i. Murmy v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988).
114. Id. at 539.
115. Justice Marhall in ig disgent argues that 'the relevant question [is] whether even if the ii entry uncovered
no evidence, the officers would retu immediately with a warrast to conduct a second searh.' Id. at 548 n.2. The majority
discounts this concer by classiying it as hypothetical and focuses on whether the fnmvdion (the prior illegal search is
not considered) in obltainng the warrst was totally disliet from the illegal search. Id. at 542 n.3.
116. Id. at 549-50.
117. .See United States v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding tat evidence discovered illegally
was admissible. becamuse police bad probable cause ad would inevitably discover it with a proper warrant), cen. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988); United Stat v. Merriweather, 777 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1985)(holding thet a warnat for second
search wet not in'alidated by a prior illegal search because the magistrate did not rely on information form the illegal samh
to issue the ,.arsrst), cert denmied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986). The ease of United Stat v. Diaz-Espimdola, No. 89-30321, 1991
W.L. 103446 (9th Cir. June 11, 1991) (designated not for publication), provides a good illustration of how the inevitable
discovery doctrine would m ially circumvent the werraut requirement. In this cas the governmnt sough to justify
a vimrautlegs search of a residence because of the exigency exception to the witrrt rquirement. (Because of an emergency
evidence about to be destroyed it was not practical to get a wraxt') During the wmantless search cocaine was discovered.
The count found that the search was illegal becamuse no exigency existed. After this initial search, the police sought to get
a warrant including in the affidavit the previously discovered cocaine. The court held tat there was sufficirt justification
to iue a wenast without mentioning the cocaine discovered through the illegality and ta the cocaine would have been
inevitably discovered based on the valid warrant "Therefore we hold thd any tmast from the inclusion of cocaine discovery
in the affidavit %w dissipated since the officers would have inevitably discovered it during their valid, wrmated search.'
Id. at *2; see alaso United States v. Gordils, 725 F. Supp. 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that because evidence would
have ultimately been found, the evidence seized during an unAur'rted search was clealy admissible).
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The case of United States v. Whitehorn... provides a good illustration of
how the inevitable discovery doctrine would substantially circumvent the
warrant requirement. In this case there was an illegal warrantless search
of a residence. At the time of the illegal search the government was
working on the application for a search warrant. The court held that since
there was sufficient justification to issue a warrant prior to the illegality,
the evidence would have been inevitably discovered based upon the valid
warrant. The court indicated even if the police had waited for the results
of the illegal warrantless search, the evidence still would have been
admitted. "Finally, the Nix Court rejected the assertion that this equilibri-
um somehow changed, and required suppression, when the police acted in
bad faith in illegally detecting the challenged evidence. So long as it is
clear that such evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful
means, suppression is inappropriate."" 9 It is interesting to note that
courts utilizing inevitable discovery to avoid the warrant requirement do so
without considering the ramifications of their actions on the warrant
requirements.120
C. Active Pursuit Requiremente
The alternative investigation required of the police to qualify for the
inevitable discovery exception also has an effect on the warrant require-
ment. The oft cited case of United States v. Grffin 12 provides a good
example of this interrelationship. In this case the police illegally entered
the suspect's apartment with the purpose of securing it. Simultaneous with
the discovery of various drug paraphernalia, an officer was sent to obtain
a search warrant. The government sought to allow admission of evidence
discbvered as a result of a warrantless search by arguing that it planned to
obtain a warrant. Because the agents could have obtained a warrant, the
court was asked to find the inevitable discovery exception. In refusing to
find inevitable discovery in this decision, a case in which the alternative
investigation was pursued at the same time the illegality was occurring, the
court indicated that if it were to find inevitable discovery in this situation
it would "emasculate the search warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment."123 The Ninth Circuit followed this rationale in United
118. 829 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at1231 (citiog m at445).
120. See prm notes 46-53 and accomponying text.
121. United Stae v. Saterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (1934) ( 'Ilhe prosecuion must demonst'ate 1it the lawful means
which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively puroed prior to the occurrence of
the illegal conduct" Id. at 846 (emphasis in origioal), citing United States v. Brooki g, 614 F.2d 1037, 1042 n.2, 1048(5th Cir. 1980D).
122. 502 F.2d 959 (6th dir. 1974), erlt. dtied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974).
123. Id. at 961; see, e.g., United Shates v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 846 (1934) (ho!ding that the f ct that a search
worrmat vms obtained after illegal warartless aeareh does net allow application of hziaibla discovery doctrim: "Becaue
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States v. Allard,"A a case in which evidence was obtained as a result of
illegally securing the suspect's room while an officer was sent to get a
warrant. The Allard Court stated that "[a]ny other holding would
encourage law enforcement to tsecure' or seize places and things with or
without probable cause in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstanc-
es while they seek some independent evidentiary basis to justify a search
warrant."125 It should be pointed out that in light of Murray, if initially
illegally discovered evidence is later discovered by lawful means, the court
allows for the independent source exception.1" Both Giffin and Allard
appear to be factually similar to Murray and, thus, the same rationale may
apply. 127
As previously mentioned, the Nix decision involved "active pursuit"
of the alternative investigation." There was a search party looking for
the body when the illegality (the search) occurred. This active pursuit has
been characterized by Brent R. Appel as "independent inevitable discov-
ery" because the lawful investigation would get to the same evidence as the
unlawful investigation without any relation whatsoever to the illegal
investigation. 9  "In this context, the inevitable discovery exception
a val search warrant nearly always can be obtained after the search has occurred, a contrary holding would practically
destroy the requirement that a warrant for the search of a home be obtained before the search taks place."), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1117 (1985); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 415 N.E.2d 818, 823 (M.s. 1981) (rejecting the lower comt's inevitable
discovery reasoning that a warht would have been issued without an illegal search. "[]e decline to apply the rule in a
situ tion where its effect would be to read out of the Constituion the requirement that he police follow certain protective
procedures-in this case, the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment"); State v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 625, 629
(N.D. 1981) (finding that evidence was inadmissible where police intruded into the defensat's home without a warrant and
searched the premises, reasoning that "i]f the inevitable discovery theory applied when a short cut was taken, as in the
instant.case, the net result would be that he magistie's determination of prohable came as required by the [Fourth
[A]mendmett would be eliminated for all practical purposes."); State v. Anderson, 466 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) ("To equate discovery based on wntainted independent source with investigation based on tainted source would
transform inevitable discovery doctrine into permission for police to conduct a fishing expedition using tainted evidence as
their bait. That strikes at the very heat of 4th amendment [sic] protections."), rev'd on other grounds, 477 N.W.2d 277
(Wis. 1991).
Bu see United States v. Sanchez, 719 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding thot evidence discovered during
illegal security sweep was admissible because it would inevitably be discovered when a valid warrant was executed), affid,
902 F.2d 1556 (2A Cir. 1990); Stare v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1984) (en bane) (reasoning that an illegal
warrantless search of premises does net require exclusion in view of the Y= inevitable discovery doctrine, for "a search
%%'eiat could have been obtainfed].").
124. 634 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 1187; see United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985) ("When the police forego legal
means of investigaion ... the need to deter is Paramount and requires application of the exclusionry rule."), appeal afer
remand, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. dened, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987).
126. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988).
127. Griffin, 502 F.2d at 960; Afard, 634 F.2d at 1184. It should be poited out thet in Griffm and Allard the
illegality, the seizure, was ongoing, whereas in Murray the illegality had ended and the warrant search was conducted to
re-discover what had previously been illegally discovered. Murray, 487 U.S. at 535-36.
128. See Nix v. William, 467 U.S. 431, 448-49 (1984).
129. Appel, mpra note 45, at 112. "Indepenent inevitable discovery" involves procedures "that police routinely would
have set in motion given the circumstances of a particular ease." I.; see, e.g., United States v. Bieuvenue, 632 F.2d 910,
914 (lst Cir. 1980) (following indepenleat leads); United States v. Seobolein, 423 F.2d 1051, 1052-53 (4th Cit. 1970) (FBI
identification check), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(coroner's report), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224 (1975) (routine records of gun
dealers), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Another example of 'independent inevitable discovery" are so-called
saturation searches, which are massive investigations designed to leave no stone unturned. See, e.g., United States v. Falley,
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merely stands for the common sense principle that vagaries of the timing
of discovery will not defeat introduction of evidence that would otherwise
clearly be admissible under the independent source rule."'" This is the
type of inevitable discovery that Justice Burger referred to in Nix, when he
declared that there is "functional similarity between these two doctrines
[inevitable discovery doctrine and the independent source rule]." '131
Thus, the illegal discovery merely accelerated discovery which would have
inevitably occurred.132
The active pursuit requirement of Nix has, for the most part, remained
in effect. However, there appears to be at least a willingness among some
of the circuits to depart from the mandate of active pursuit as required by
Nix. For example, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Namer33 indicat-
ed that it might be more willing to find inevitable discovery without the
necessity of actively pursuing the investigation. 1 This represents a
switch in analysis from "what was done" to "what would they have done."
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval,135 asserts that
it is not necessary that an investigation be initiated prior to illegal conduct,
only that a routine procedure that the police would have followed would
have led to the evidence. 136 The First Circuit found that the requirement
489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 1973) (massive investigation to uncover mreoic importetion); Government of the Viqin sland-
v. Careau, 502 F.2d 914, 929-30 (3rd Cir. 1974) (large scale police search for murder weapon), cert. darted, 420 U.S, 909
(1975).
130. Appel, smpra note 45, at 112; see United States v. Apker, 705 F.2d 293, 306-07 (&h Cir. 19M3) (EWe do not think
that probative evidence should be excluded merely becamuse an invalid , rrmat affected timing of discovery of the
evidence."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
131. Nix v. WOlliacs, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
132. Harold S. Novikoff, Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Ezception to the Consiianal Evcmicusyar Ruki, 74
COLUM. L. RLE. 88, 91 (1974); see also United Stats v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431, 1433 (1916) (holding that routino
booking procedure and inventory would inevitably result in discovery of evidence). The prime advartago of an active pursuit
requirement is that it would take the inevitable discovery exception out ofthe spculative realm. HL-tormnnlly, active pursuit
has been required by most courts when faced with sherative, albeit inetive, sta sard police procedures, wudch would have
led to the discovery of the evidence. Robert M. Pither, Te Frut of the Pcinro Tree" Re i*ted tard Mepardized, 56
CAL. L. Rov. 579, 629 (1968) ('It is extremely rare to find a normal, lawful police procedure which is regularly followed
and inevitably would iave discloied the exact c mne information. ). One could aiways make a speculativo a unent as to
what the police wo ld have done in a particular situation. A concern for a lack of aetive pursuit vms expressed by couds
early on in United Saes v. Paroutan, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
[A] showing that the government Wad sufficient indepenlert information available so that in the normal
course of events it might have discovered the questioned evidence without an letl Search cannot excuse
the ilegality or care tainted matter. Such a rule would relax the proteetion of the right of privacy in the
very cases in wih, by the governme's own, admission, there is no reeson for an unlawful eaclh. The
better the goveranent's case against an individual, the freer it would be to invade his privacy. We cannot
accept such a result. The test must be cone of actalities, not possibilities.
Id. t 469. But 01 Payton, 45 N.Y.S.2d at 401-02:
In the first place the la "inevitable discovery" is inaccurate and therefore misleading. 71e doterine does not call
for certitude as the literal meaning of the adjective "inevitable" would suggest. What is required is tht theo be
a very high degree of probability thnt the evidence in question would iave beea obtained independently of the aited
133. 835 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.), cert. daded, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
134. Id. at 1088; see also United t v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1206 (1935) ('[ancertain circumstances ., . the
absec of a stroug deterrent interest may warrnst the application of the inevitable discovery exception whthout a showing
of active pursit.").
135. 872 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1989).
136. Id. at 1399; see United States v. Boatwright, 822 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1937); see also United Statcs v. Thoma,
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that a separate investigation which constitutes inevitable discovery be set
in motion is too rigid a test and interpreted Nix as not requiring active
pursuit.137 That circuit decided that where probable cause existed prior
to illegality and where a warrant was applied for soon after, ,the inevitable
discovery exception must apply."'
The type of inevitable discovery in which the alternative means was
undertaken after the illegal discovery has been characterized by Appel as
"dependent inevitable discovery."139 He described this as "after the fact
repair of unlawful conduct. " " This inactive pursuit of the alternative
investigation at the time of the illegality appears to have found support in
Murray.4 1  In this independent source exception case, the majority
refused to adopt a requirement of demonstrated verifiable fact, opting
instead to rely on an assurance from the police that they intended to get a
warrant.142 Thus, an argument could be made that active pursuit is no
longer necessary, and merely a reasonable probability of an alternative
investigation is all that is required.
.Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Murray that active
pursuit was required by the Nix decision.1" He further pointed out the
ramifications of not requiring active pursuit, stating that the police, even
when they have sufficient justification, would perform a warrantless
confirmatory search before going to the hassle of getting a warrant.'45
He disagreed with the majority's approach of relying merely on the intent
of the officers to obtain a search warrant.'" He stated that he would
prefer "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment,"1 47 or, in other words, a showing that the police were in
the process or had sought a warrant prior to the initial entry. The Court's
955 F.2d 207, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring a showing that the inevitability of discove y "arise firom circumstances other
than those disclosed by the illegal search itself," instead of imposing a "blanset requiremez" of active pursuit), appeal aer
rad, 963 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Giovanelli, 747 F. Sapp. 891, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (rejecting
argumeht hat process of applying fer worrant must begin before or during search before inevitable discovery doctrne may
be invoked). Some slate cors have also started to abandon the active pursuit requiremert. See e.g., State v. Milliom, 794
S.W.2d 181, 185 (Mo. 1990) (n[lit maies little sene to conclul that the inevitable discovery exception applies only in
circumhsces in wbich law enforcement officers are already involved in a search."); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 243
(Or. 198&) ( [W] do not understand M to require that one [investigation] actwally be inder way."); People v. Thomas,
478 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Nlice. App. 1991) ("[W]e ar satisfied that a search would have been conducted at subsequent time
that would hove yielded the physicl evidmce obtained.").
137. United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 746 (lot Cir. 1986); see abo United States v. Diaz-Fpindola, No. 89-
30321, 1991 WL 103446, at *2 (9th Cir. June 11, 1991) (designated not for publication) (expressing tht there is no
distncdou made between, primary and secondary evidence and no concern for the avoulanco of the warrant requirement).
138. See United States v. Smith, 666 F. Supp. 645, 649 n.5 (D. Vt. 1987) (discussing dvsuti, 787 F.2d at 736).
139. Appel, mra note 45, at 120.
140. Id. at 114.
141. Murray v. United Ste, 487 U.S. 533, 541-42 (1988).
142. Id. at 540 n.2.
143. For an excellent discussion of tbis, see United States v. Iast, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cih. 1991).
144. 487 U.S. at 544-45.
145. Id. at 547.
146. Id. at 549.
147. Id. (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 rL5 (1984).
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approach in Murray, along with the loosening of the active pursuit
requirement of the inevitable discovery exception and the insensitivity that
the Court has shown toward the use of warrants, could likely signal the
further deterioration of the warrant requirement.
V. Conclusion
Although some courts have taken a more restrictive approach to the
inevitable discovery exception than the Supreme Court in Nix,148  many
jurisdictions, including most of the circuits, have expanded the exception
beyond what was envisioned in Nix. The most widespread expansion and
potentially the one with the greatest ramifications has to do with the
utilization of this exception for primary as well as secondary evidence.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly dealt with this issue, it has
indicated a lack of sensitivity to the problem, as indicated by the Murray
decision. 49 The Murray case is consistent with the Court's decisions in
recent years, which have generally shown reluctance to apply the
exclusionary rule."5
This reluctance can be seen in the Court's recent approach to
derivative evidence. In New York v Harris,5 the Court limited the
derivative effect of an illegal home arrest to the evidence that was obtained
in the home."' As a result of the arrest, the police acquired statements
from the defendant, both in his home and later at the station house.153
The statement made at the station house was not subject to a fruits
analysis." The Court focused on the purpose of the requirement for an
arrest warrant in the home; finding that the rule was designed to protect the
sanctity of the home, the Court limited its derivative evidence scope to the
home. "[The rule] was not intended to grant criminal suspects, like
Harris, protection for statements made outside their premises where the
police have probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a
crime."155 This avoidance of exclusion of the secondary evidence could
indicate a willingness to limit the thrust of to the fruits doctrine. The
14i. In tharea of good faith, see mpra note 45. In the area of burden of proof, see spra notes 29-30. V.1th rcsrd
to th. necessity for a -aumt, see supVm ntea 106-111 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying note 84.
150. BLOOM AND BRODIN, ,.pom note 3 at 5. Th rem a mitations imposed on who is deem=d to bave 'ctavding" to
mise Fourth Amendment objections and on the type of proceedings where supreeion remedy applies. The Court hia also
created a "good faith" exce aion, thereby removing police actions, wich %we carried out with reasomble belief that action
v,.s not a cointigaional violation, from the scope of the exclusionary rule. In addition, the Court hIs modified the
substantive contituional doctrine in a ay that minimie the constaint on the pcl6c conduct.
151. 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
152. Id. at 17-18; see aha Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (refusing to apply the frTits nalysis when therm
was a Mimarda violtion and indicating that the violaon of Mwanda did nat implicate the Fifth Arazrdmet).
153. 495 U.S. at 16.
154. Id. at 16-17.
155. Id. at 17.
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Court's general attitude toward the exclusionary rule, coupled with a
decision like Harris, suggests that if the Court were faced with the
opportunity it might liberalize the requirements for applying inevitable
discovery to avoid the exclusion of secondary evidence. However, the
Court has not explicitly indicated that it has plans to apply the inevitable
discovery exception to primary evidence. Nevertheless, in light of Murray,
it is not surprising that the lower courts have chosen to utilize the
inevitable discovery exception to avoid the exclusion of primary evidence.
Another expansion of the inevitable discovery exception has to do with
its utilization to avoid the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
The demise of the warrant requirement by the Supreme Court has been
going on for a number of years.1" This trend, coupled with the Murray
decision, has encouraged most lower courts to give short shrift to the
concerns of the warrant requirement and to apply the inevitable discovery
exception even if it effectively eliminates the incentive to obtain a warrant.
This approach is usually taken without discussion.157
As this Article has shown, the inevitable discovery exception, which
was, at least initially, an exception to the fruits doctrine, has been
expanded beyond the Nix decision. Underlying this expansion has been the
intent to avoid the application of the exclusionary rule. The application of
the exception to avoid the exclusion of primary evidence could well signal
the de facto elimination of the exclusionary rule. In addition, the
utilization of the inevitable discovery exception to avoid the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, along with other expansions to
warrantless activity, could result in the diminution of an already diluted
warrant requirement. Thus, these expansions of the inevitable discovery
exception have very serious ramifications indeed. Given the Supreme
Court's lack of sensitivity to these issues, it is likely that expansions to the
inevitable discovery exception will continue unabated, unless the Court
heeds the advise of Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Nix: "The
majority refers to the societal cost of excluding probative evidence ....
In my view, the more relevant cost is that imposed on society by police
officers who decide to take procedural shortcuts instead of complying with
the law."' 58
156. See supra notes 93-100 and accompnying text; see generLa!y Bloom, xpra note 94 (smzny hstorically the
changes in the armt requiremed).
157. See supra notes 112-120 and accompanying tex. Once again it shodd be polotd out that some state couts have,
ben more senitive to the wirstrequ remezt. See sqm'a tea accompanying note 120.
158. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 457 (1984).
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